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Abstract
Oblivious transfer is a cryptographic primitive where Alice has two bits and Bob wishes
to learn some function of them. Ideally, Alice should not learn Bob’s desired function choice
and Bob should not learn any more than what is logically implied by the function value. While
decent quantum protocols for this task are known, many become completely insecure if an
adversary were to control the quantum devices used in the implementation of the protocol.
In this work we give a fully device-independent quantum protocol for XOR oblivious transfer
which is provably more secure than any classical protocol.
1 Introduction
Oblivious transfer is an important cryptographic primitive in two-party computation as it can
be used as a universal building block for constructing more elaborate protocols [Kil88]. Indeed,
some quantum protocols for this task are known [WST08, Sch07, CKS13, CGS16]. However, it
can be shown that there do not exist classical protocols with any level of information-theoretic
security, and there do not exist quantum protocols with perfect security [CKS13, Lo97].
In this paper, we consider a variant of oblivious transfer called XOR oblivious transfer (XOT).
This is the two-party cryptographic primitive in which two spatially separated parties, Alice and
Bob, wish to do the following task: Alice outputs two bits (x0, x1), which are uniformly random,
and Bob outputs a trit b which is uniformly random, as well as xb where we define x2 = x0 ⊕ x1.
In other words, Alice and Bob communicate and Bob learns one bit of information from Alice’s
two bits (either the first bit, second bit, or their XOR). When designing XOT protocols, the security
goals are:
1. Completeness: If both parties are honest, then their outcomes are consistent (i.e., xb is the
correct value), uniformly random, and neither party aborts.
2. Soundness against cheating Bob: If Alice is honest, then a dishonest (i.e., cheating) Bob cannot
learn both x0 and x1 by digressing from protocol.
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3. Soundness against cheating Alice: If Bob is honest, then a dishonest (i.e., cheating) Alice cannot
learn b by digressing from protocol.
Remark 1. One could imagine a situation where Alice already has a fixed choice of (x0, x1) that she wishes
to input into a XOT protocol (perhaps from the result of an earlier computation). However, we can use the
outcomes of an XOT protocol as described above as a one-time pad to convey the information to Bob. For
more details, see [CKS13].
XOR Oblivious Transfer
(x0, x1, x2 = x0 ⊕ x1) (b, xb)
Figure 1: Desired outputs for XOR oblivious transfer (XOT).
In this paper we are concerned with information-theoretic security, meaning that Alice and Bob
are only bounded by the laws of quantum mechanics. In other words, Alice and Bob can perform
arbitrarily complicated computations, have arbitrarily large quantum memories, and so on. We
shall have occasion to change how much control Alice and Bob have over the protocol, but pre-
cisely what actions are allowed to be performed by dishonest parties should be clear from context,
and will be described shortly.
We focus on studying XOT protocols from the perspective of assuming perfect completeness
and trying to make them as sound as possible.1 To this end, we choose to quantify the soundness
via cheating probabilities, which we define as follows:
PXOTB : The maximum probability with which a dishonest Bob can learn both of honest Alice’s
outcome bits (x0, x1) and the protocol does not abort.
PXOTA : The maximum probability with which a dishonest Alice can learn honest Bob’s choice
outcome b and the protocol does not abort.
Any XOT protocol with perfect completeness necessarily has PXOTA ≥ 13 and PXOTB ≥ 12 , since a
dishonest Alice could always guess one of three choices for Bob’s outcome b uniformly at random
and, similarly, dishonest Bob can follow the honest protocol to gain perfect knowledge of x0, x1,
or x0 ⊕ x1, and then randomly guess the unknown bit in Alice’s outcome (x0, x1).
Remark 2. In this work, we chose to quantify soundness via cheating probabilities, but we note that such
a measure of security is not necessarily composable [WW08, VPdR19]. Unfortunately, it can be very
challenging to prove that a protocol is composably secure, and in some settings such protocols are in fact
impossible [VPdR19]. As a first analysis of the protocol proposed in this work, we will restrict ourselves to
studying the cheating probabilities only.
1To contrast, the task of finding protocols with perfect soundness and the best possible completeness was considered
in [SCK14].
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Since the lowest possible bounds on PXOTA and P
XOT
B for perfectly complete XOT protocols are
asymmetric, we shall consider them in pairs and will not concern ourselves with finding an “op-
timal protocol”. Instead, we motivate our work by asking the following question:
“Is is possible to create quantum protocols where both PXOTA , P
XOT
B < 1 when Alice and Bob do not even
trust their own quantum devices?”
When taken literally, this question cannot be answered in the affirmative, since arbitrarily ma-
licious devices could simply broadcast all desired information to a dishonest party. However, it
turns out that there exist quantum protocols that can be proven secure using almost no assump-
tions other than ruling out this extreme scenario (which seems a rather necessary assumption in
any case). This is the notion of device-independent security, which typically exploits nonlocal games
played using entangled states. In a fully device-independent model, one only assumes that the
parties’ devices do not directly broadcast certain information to the dishonest party and/or each
other (we shall explain this in more detail in Section 1.4). In particular, one does not assume
that the states and/or measurements implemented by the devices are known, and even the di-
mensions of the quantum systems are not specified. Device-independent security analyses exist
for other cryptographic tasks such as quantum key distribution [PAB+09, AFDF+18], bit commit-
ment [SCA+11, AMPS16], and coin-flipping [ACK+14].
While we have described the fully device-independent framework above, one can instead
choose to trust some subset of the properties described, leading to various levels of semi-device-
independent security. For instance, Alice and Bob could trust state preparation devices, measure-
ment devices, quantum operations, or any combination of the above.
In this work, we examine the security of quantum XOT protocols in semi-device-independent
and device-independent scenarios. By a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation PXOTA
and PXOTB to denote the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob in all the different scenarios, cor-
responding to differently defined cheating capabilities of the dishonest party. For example, if we
were to allow a dishonest Alice to control Bob’s measurements, it may lead to a different value of
PXOTA . The cheating capabilities of cheating parties should be clear from context when we discuss
PXOTA and P
XOT
B .
1.1 Trivial protocols
For readers new to oblivious transfer, we present two bad classical protocols and a simple
quantum protocol.
Protocol 1 (Bad XOT Protocol 1).
1. Alice chooses (x0, x1) uniformly at random and sends (x0, x1) to Bob.
2. Bob chooses b uniformly at random.
3. Alice outputs (x0, x1) and Bob outputs (b, xb).
A moment’s thought shows that Bob has full information (he clearly learns (x0, x1) while Alice
has no information). Therefore, we have
PXOTA = 1/3 and P
XOT
B = 1 (1)
which is as insecure concerning cheating Bob as possible.
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Protocol 2 (Bad XOT Protocol 2).
1. Bob chooses b uniformly at random and sends b to Alice.
2. Alice chooses (x0, x1) uniformly at random and sends xb to Bob.
3. Alice outputs (x0, x1) and Bob outputs (b, xb).
Here Alice has full information while Bob has none. Therefore, we have
PXOTA = 1 and P
XOT
B = 1/2. (2)
Remark 3. Surprisingly, these protocols can be useful for protocol design. For instance, suppose Alice
wishes to test Bob to see if he has been cheating, and aborts if and only if the test fails. Then if the test
passes, the parties need a way to finish executing the protocol, which they could do using Protocol 1 (which
is independent of previous steps in the tested protocol).
1.2 A quantum protocol for XOT with no device-independent security
Here we present the oblivious transfer protocol from [CKS13] adapted to the XOT setting. For
b ∈ {0, 1, 2}, let |ψ±b 〉 ∈ XY denote the following two-qutrit state:
|ψ±b 〉 =

1√
2
(|00〉XY ± |22〉XY ) if b = 0,
1√
2
(|11〉XY ± |22〉XY ) if b = 1,
1√
2
(|00〉XY ± |11〉XY ) if b = 2.
(3)
Note that for every b ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we have that |ψ+b 〉 and |ψ−b 〉 are orthogonal. We are now ready to
state the protocol.
Protocol 3.
1. Bob chooses b ∈ {0, 1, 2} uniformly at random, prepares the state |ψ+b 〉 in registers XY , and sends
the register X to Alice.
2. Alice chooses (x0, x1) uniformly at random, performs the unitary
U(x0,x1) = (−1)x0 |0〉〈0|+ (−1)x1 |1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈2| (4)
on X , and then sends it back to Bob.
3. Bob performs the 2-outcome measurement {|ψ+b 〉〈ψ+b | ,1− |ψ+b 〉〈ψ+b |} and records his outcome as
c = 0 if he gets |ψ+b 〉〈ψ+b | and c = 1 otherwise.
4. Alice outputs (x0, x1) and Bob outputs (b, c).
Protocol 3 can be checked to be complete (i.e., Bob always gets the correct outcome). The
cheating probabilities in this protocol in the cases of trusted and untrusted devices are given by
Theorem 1 below. We give a proof for the trusted case in Section 3, and the relatively simple proof
for the untrusted case is given below.
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Theorem 1. In Protocol 3, the cheating probabilities are as listed in the following table. (In the untrusted
setting, Alice controls Bob’s state preparation and Bob controls Alice’s unitary.)
PXOTA P
XOT
B
Trusted devices 1/2 3/4
Untrusted devices 1 1
Untrusted device cheating strategies. As indicated in the second row of the above table, the
protocol is not secure when the devices are untrusted. To see this, assume Bob has full control
over Alice’s unitary. It could be a unitary which implements a superdense coding protocol:
Ucheat(x0,x1) =

1X if (x0, x1) = (0, 0),
σX if (x0, x1) = (0, 1),
σY if (x0, x1) = (1, 0),
σZ if (x0, x1) = (1, 1),
(5)
where σX, σY, and σZ are the Pauli operators. Note that this unitary acts on a qubit (which we
can assume Bob sends if he wishes), or just define it such that it acts trivially on the |2〉 subspace.
Now, if Bob creates |ψ+2 〉 at the beginning of the protocol, he is left with a state from the Bell basis
at the end of the protocol. In other words, he can perfectly learn (x0, x1).
In the case of cheating Alice, she can simply control Bob’s state preparation device to prepare
the state |b〉 |0〉 ∈ XY on input b, and have Bob send the register X . From this state, Alice simply
measures it to learn b. Thus, we have
PXOTA = 1 and P
XOT
B = 1 [Devices are NOT trusted]. (6)
Thus, we need a clever way to design protocols where Alice and Bob cannot cheat in the above
fashion. This motivates the need for device-independent XOT protocols and some protocol design
ideas that should be avoided.
1.3 A semi-device-independent XOT protocol from magic square
Similar to device-independent protocols which exist for other cryptographic tasks, we design
our protocols using nonlocal games. In this work, we shall make use of the nonlocal game known
as the Mermin-Peres magic square game. In the magic square game,
• Alice and Bob receive respective inputs a ∈ {0, 1, 2} and b ∈ {0, 1, 2} independently and
uniformly at random.
• Alice outputs three bits (x0, x1, x2) ∈ {0, 1}3 such that x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 = 0 and Bob outputs
three bits (y0, y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1}3 such that y0 ⊕ y1 ⊕ y2 = 1.
• Alice and Bob win the game if xb = ya.
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If Alice and Bob are allowed only classical strategies (using e.g. shared randomness), the magic
square game cannot be won with probability greater than 8/9. However, there exists a quan-
tum strategy, where Alice and Bob share prior entanglement, which wins the magic square game
with probability 1. We shall refer to this strategy as the magic square strategy which is detailed in
Section 2.
Now, suppose Alice and Bob play the magic square game according to the above description.
Notice that x2 will always be equal to x0 ⊕ x1, similar to the definition of XOT, and that (x0, x1)
is uniformly distributed (see Section 2). Also, for each of Bob’s input choices, he learns either x0,
x1, or x2 = x0 ⊕ x1 depending on the choice of input a for Alice. Since a is chosen uniformly
at random, this is almost a proper XOT protocol (putting aside soundness for now). The only
missing ingredient is that Bob knows he has xb, but does not know which of the bits of (y0, y1, y2)
it is. To fix this small issue, we simply have Alice tell Bob which bit it is.
We formalize this protocol below and add in a test step that helps to prevent cheating. Strictly
speaking, Protocol 4 should be thought of as a protocol framework, as we have not specified who
creates the entangled state that Alice and Bob share — either party can. We consider different
security analyses of Protocol 4, corresponding to each of these different cases. In the trusted state
analysis, the honest party (whomever that may be) creates the state, and in the untrusted state
analysis it is the cheating party who does so.
Protocol 4 (Quantum XOT protocol from the magic square game).
1. Alice and Bob share the bipartite state used in the magic square strategy.
2. Bob chooses b ∈ {0, 1, 2} uniformly at random, performs the measurements corresponding to b in
the magic square strategy on his state to get the outcome (y0, y1, y2 = y0 ⊕ y1 ⊕ 1), and sends
(y0, y1, y2) to Alice.
3. Alice chooses a ∈ {0, 1, 2} uniformly at random and sends a to Bob.
4. Alice performs the measurement corresponding to a in her magic square strategy on her state to get
the outcome (x0, x1, x2 = x0 ⊕ x1).
5. Test: If (x0, x1, x2) = (0, 0, 0) and Bob has sent (y0, y1, y2) such that ya = 1, then Alice aborts.
6. Alice outputs (x0, x1) and Bob outputs (b, ya).
shared state
y
a
Test(x, y, a)
Accept
Output x
Reject
Abort Output (b, ya = xb)
Figure 2: Schematic depiction of the messages sent in Protocol 4.
Intuitively, the test step in Protocol 4 serves as a weak test that the magic square winning
condition is fulfilled (though the test only occurs with somewhat small probability). This provides
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a way to partially certify that Bob has measured his share of the state before learning Alice’s input.
(Note that if Bob has not measured his state yet, then even when the states are trusted, he has
the potential to perfectly learn Alice’s output after learning her input, by simply performing the
same measurement as Alice on his state. However, forcing him to perform the magic square
measurement “deletes” some of this information; a notion referred to as certified deletion in [FM18].)
It is easily verified that Protocol 4 is complete when Alice and Bob use a strategy that wins the
magic square game with certainty. To prove its soundness, we bound the cheating probabilities
using appropriate SDPs, as described in Section 3, for the trusted state and untrusted state cases.
We summarize these cheating probabilities in the following theorem, and below it we explain why
Alice and Bob can cheat perfectly if they control the other’s measurement devices.
Theorem 2. If Alice and Bob play the “canonical” strategy for the magic square game (see Section 2), then
the cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob in Protocol 4 are bounded (from above) by the values in the table
below, rounded to 5 decimal places. The bounds for cheating Alice are tight.
Upper bounds PXOTA P
XOT
B
Trusted state 0.83333 0.93628
Untrusted state 0.87268 0.94096
Untrusted measurement 1 1
Untrusted-measurement scenario. As the last row of the table in Theorem 2 indicates, Protocol 4
is not fully device-independent. To see this, note that if Bob were to control Alice’s measurements,
he can force (x0, x1) = (0, 1) to always occur (regardless of the state, by performing a trivial mea-
surement), and then he will never be tested. This also fixes the value of (x0, x1), so Bob knows
it perfectly. Conversely, if Alice controls Bob’s measurement, she can force the output to be such
that yb = 1 and the other two bits are 0. Then Bob’s message fully reveals b to Alice.
1.4 A fully device-independent protocol
We now aim to find an XOT protocol based on the magic square game that is fully device-
independent. We shall first clarify the premises and assumptions in such a setting. Specifically,
we shall suppose that Alice and Bob each possess one of a pair of black boxes, each of which will
accept a classical input in {0, 1, 2} and return a classical output in {0, 1}3. We shall only require
a single use of these boxes. In the honest scenario, the boxes will simply be implementing the
ideal magic square states and measurements. If either party is dishonest, however, we shall sup-
pose only that the boxes’ behaviour can be modelled as follows: the boxes share some entangled
state between them, and when one of the boxes receives an input, it returns the output of some
measurement (conditioned on the input) performed on its share of the quantum state, without
broadcasting either its input or output to any party other than the one holding the box2. While the
honest party can only interact with the box as specified, the dishonest party is able to “open” any
box they possess and perform arbitrary quantum operations or measurements on the share of the
2To take a slightly different perspective (used in e.g. [AFDF+18]), we could suppose that the honest party is able to
“shield” their lab in a way such that signals cannot be broadcast out of it once they have supplied the input to their box.
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state held by that box. However, the dishonest party cannot interact with or change the behaviour
of a box while it is in the honest party’s possession.
This describes the general device-independent setting. For the purposes of this work, we shall
impose a small additional assumption on the states and measurements the boxes implement,
namely that they are described by a tensor product of Hilbert spaces, one for each box. More
general scenarios could be considered (for instance, one could require only that the two boxes’
measurements commute), but these are outside the scope of this work.
It would seem difficult to design a secure protocol under such weak assumptions. However,
we can exploit the fact that many nonlocal games (including the magic square game) exhibit the
important property of self-testing or rigidity: if the boxes win the game with probability equal to
the maximum quantum value, then they must be implementing the ideal state and measurements
(up to trivial isometries). A robust version of this statement is formally expressed as Lemma 5 in
the next section.
This suggests the following idea to make Protocol 4 fully device-independent: we introduce an
initial step where with some probability, either party may ask the other to send over their box, so
they can perform a single-shot test of whether the boxes win the magic square game. To prevent
a dishonest party from always calling for a test, we shall enforce that a party calling for a test
must then cede all control if the test is passed, performing an XOT protocol that is perfectly secure
against them. If a test is not called, the parties simply perform Protocol 4. We describe this idea
more formally as Protocol 5 below.
Qualitatively, Protocol 5 imposes a “tradeoff” for the cheating party between passing the test (if
it is called) and the extent to which they deviate from the ideal implementation of Protocol 4. More
specifically, if (say) Bob is dishonest, he could cheat perfectly if Alice decides to test, by having
both boxes implement the honest behaviour, and he could also cheat perfectly if Alice decides
not to test, but to do so he needs to modify Alice’s box’s behaviour (since our device-dependent
arguments show that perfect cheating is impossible when Alice’s box is honest). Since Alice’s box
must behave differently in the two scenarios and Bob cannot change how that box behaves once
the protocol starts, Alice can constrain his cheating probability by randomly choosing between
testing and not testing. A similar argument applies to cheating Alice.
Note that for this reasoning to be valid, it is important that the honest party’s box cannot be
allowed to detect whether it is being subjected to a magic square test or whether it is being used for
Protocol 4 (we are implicitly assuming that the honest party’s box behaves the same way in both
situations). An assumption of this nature is typically required in device-independent protocols
that involve performing a test with some probability, e.g. [ACK+14, AFDF+18]. In particular, as
observed in [ACK+14], we note that if the behaviour of the boxes could be time-dependent, then
the honest party must ensure they provide the input to their box at a fixed pre-determined time,
regardless of whether the box is being tested or used for Protocol 4.
Protocol 5 (Quantum XOT protocol from the magic square game with extra test steps).
1. Alice flips a coin whose outcome is 0 with probability 1− qA, to obtain cA ∈ {0, 1}, which she sends
to Bob.
2. (a) If cA = 0, Bob flips a coin whose outcome is 0 with probability 1− qB, to obtain cB ∈ {0, 1},
which he sends to Alice.
(b) If cA = 1, Bob sends his box to Alice.
3. (a) If cA = 0, cB = 0, Alice and Bob perform Protocol 4 henceforth.
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(b) If cA = 0, cB = 1, Alice sends her box to Bob.
(c) If cA = 1, Alice receives Bob’s box, picks aA, bA ∈ {0, 1, 2} uniformly at random to input into
her and Bob’s boxes, and checks if the outputs xA, yA satisfy xAbA = y
A
aA . If not, she aborts.
4. If cA = 0, cB = 1, Bob receives Alice’s box, picks aB, bB ∈ {0, 1, 2} uniformly at random to input
into his and Alice’s boxes, and checks if the outputs xB, yB satisfy xBbB = y
B
aB . If not, he aborts.
5. (a) If cA = 1 and Alice has not aborted, Alice and Bob perform Protocol 1 henceforth.
(b) If cA = 0, cB = 1 and Bob has not aborted, Alice and Bob perform Protocol 2 henceforth.
Alice flips
a coin
cA = 0 cA = 1
Bob flips
a coin
cB = 0 cB = 1
Protocol 4
Alice sends
her box
Bob self-
tests MS
Accept
Protocol 2
Reject
Abort
Bob sends
his box
Alice self-
tests MS
Accept
Protocol 1
Reject
Abort
Figure 3: Flowchart for Protocol 5.
We have required that when either party calls for a test, the tested party must send over their
box so that the testing party supplies an input to both boxes themselves, rather than having the
tested party self-report an input-output pair for their box. This is to ensure that the inputs to
the boxes are indeed uniformly chosen. Also, while it would be convenient if Protocol 4 did
not involve Alice sending her input to Bob (thereby more closely resembling a standard nonlocal
game), it would seem this step is necessary to allow an honest Bob to know which bit of his output
he should use, as previously mentioned regarding Protocol 4.
We give two soundness arguments for Protocol 5. The first consists of explicit numerical
bounds on the cheating probabilities, based on the family of SDPs known as the Navascue´s-
Pironio-Acı´n (NPA) hierarchy [NPA08]. We state the results as Theorem 3 below, and give the
proof in Section 4. The second is an analytic proof that the cheating probabilities are bounded
away from 1, based on the robust self-testing bounds for the magic square game [WBMS16, CN16].
We state this result formally as Theorem 4 below, and give the proof in Section 5.
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Theorem 3. Upper bounds on the cheating probabilities for Protocol 5 (the fully device-independent sce-
nario) with qA = 0.6, qB = 0.6 are given below, rounded to 5 decimal places.
Upper bounds PXOTA P
XOT
B
Fully Device-Independent 0.96440 0.99204
Remark 4. The choices for qA and qB in Theorem 3 were made by computing the bounds for different
choices of qA and qB in intervals of 0.1, then simply taking the value that yields the best bounds on the
cheating probabilities. We note that the result obtained for PXOTB is rather close to 1; however, the significant
figures shown here are within the tolerance levels of the solver.
Theorem 4. For any qA, qB > 0 in Protocol 5, there exists some δ > 0 such that PXOTA , P
XOT
B ≤ 1− δ.
1.5 Our security analysis approach
To analyze the security of the protocols for which perfect cheating is not possible, we require
a way to calculate or upper bound the optimal cheating probabilities. For most of the bounds
in this paper, we use the formalism of semidefinite programming to calculate optimal cheating
probabilities, similar in fashion to the case of coin-flipping in Kitaev [Kit02] and Gutoski and
Watrous [GW07].
A semidefinite program (SDP) is an optimization problem of the form
maximize : 〈A, X〉
subject to : Φ(X) = B
X ∈ Pos(X )
where X and Y are complex Euclidean spaces, Φ : Herm(X )→ Herm(Y) is a linear, Hermiticity-
preserving transformation, and C ∈ Herm(X ) and B ∈ Herm(Y) are Hermitian. When the spaces
are clear from context, we write X  Y to mean that X − Y is (Hermitian) positive semidefinite,
noting that the special case X  0 simply means X is positive semidefinite. We use X  Y to mean
that X−Y is positive definite.
Many of our proofs consist of modelling the optimal cheating probability of either Alice and
Bob in each protocol as an SDP and then numerically calculating the optimal value. While this
does not yield an analytical expression for the cheating probabilities, we note the following points:
• First, since each value is computed as an SDP, the dual SDPs yield certified upper bounds
on the cheating probabilities. (The primal and dual values of all SDPs we solved are iden-
tical to more significant figures than displayed in our theorem statements.) Should there be
concerns about floating-point errors, one could in principle find rational approximations to
the dual solutions and thus obtain a bound certified by exact arithmetic, but this process is
tedious and will not be included in this work.
• Second, we provide the code used (see below) so others may verify the SDP implementation
and/or apply it for any protocol modifications they may wish to study.
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• Third, the “punchline” of this work is that there exists a fully device-independent protocol
where Alice and Bob’s cheating probabilities are bounded away from 1. We show this theo-
retically and also provide the numerical upper bounds to give an idea of what the cheating
probabilities may look like.
Computational platform
The optimal value of most semidefinite programs can be approximated to within any constant
precision efficiently. In particular, our computations were performed using the MATLAB packages
QETLAB [Joh16] and YALMIP [Lo¨f04] with solver MOSEK [MOS19]. Some of the calculations
reported here were performed using the Euler cluster at ETH Zu¨rich. The code used to compute
the SDPs will be maintained at
https://github.com/ernesttyz/dixot.
1.6 Paper organization
The next section details the magic square game and a rigidity result which is needed for this
work. In Section 3, we use semidefinite programming to bound the cheating probabilities of Proto-
cols 3 and 4. The security of our device-independent protocol is analyzed numerically in Section 4,
and we refer the reader to Appendix A for background on the NPA hierarchy which we use in the
analysis. We conclude in Section 5 with the analytical bounds on the device-independent protocol.
2 The magic square game strategy and a rigidity lemma
In this section, we discuss the optimal magic square game strategy and present a rigidity result
required for this work.
The optimal quantum strategy for magic square can be described as follows. Alice and Bob
share the state
|ΨMS〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉X0Y0 + |11〉X0Y0)
1√
2
(|00〉X1Y1 + |11〉X1Y1) (7)
with Alice holding the registers X0X1, and Bob holding the registers Y0Y1. The measurements of
Alice and Bob are given in Table 1.
On input a, Alice simultaneously performs the three 2-outcome measurements {(Π0ab,Π1ab)}b
in the row indexed by a in Table 1 (it can be checked that the three measurements in every row
are compatible, so they can be performed simultaneously) on her registers X0X1. Her output
(x0, x1, x2) is the output of the three measurements (in order). Similarly, on input b, Bob simulta-
neously performs the three 2-outcome measurements {(Π0ab,Π1ab)}a in the column indexed by b
(the three measurements in every column are also compatible) on his registers Y0Y1, and gives the
outcomes of the three measurements as his output (y0, y1, y2).
Clearly, the measurement Alice performs to output xb is the same as the measurement Bob per-
forms to output ya. Since these measurements are performed on maximally entangled states, one
can show Alice and Bob always get the same outcome for xb and ya. Also, it can be verified that
these measurements always produce outcomes satisfying the parity conditions x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 = 0
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a
b
0 1 2
0
Π000 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ 1 Π001 = 1⊗ |0〉〈0| Π002 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|
+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
Π100 = |1〉〈1| ⊗ 1 Π101 = 1⊗ |1〉〈1| Π102 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈0|
1
Π010 = 1⊗ |+〉〈+| Π011 = |+〉〈+| ⊗ 1 Π012 = |+〉〈+| ⊗ |+〉〈+|
+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |−〉〈−|
Π110 = 1⊗ |−〉〈−| Π111 = |−〉〈−| ⊗ 1 Π112 = |+〉〈+| ⊗ |−〉〈−|
+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |+〉〈+|
2
Π020 = |1〉〈1| ⊗ |+〉〈+|
+ |0〉〈0| ⊗ |−〉〈−|
Π021 = |+〉〈+| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |0〉〈0|
Π022 = |+i〉〈+i| ⊗ |+i〉〈+i|
+ |−i〉〈−i| ⊗ |−i〉〈−i|
Π120 = |0〉〈0| ⊗ |+〉〈+|
+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |−〉〈−|
Π121 = |+〉〈+| ⊗ |0〉〈0|
+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
Π122 = |+i〉〈+i| ⊗ |−i〉〈−i|
+ |−i〉〈−i| ⊗ |+i〉〈+i|
Table 1: Possible measurements for either party in the quantum strategy for magic square.
and y0 ⊕ y1 ⊕ y2 = 1 (this holds regardless of the state). It can be shown that the output distri-
bution is uniform over all combinations that win the magic square game, i.e. Pr(xy|ab) = 1/8 if
xb = ya (and x, y satisfy the parity conditions), and Pr(xy|ab) = 0 otherwise.
The above description views Alice and Bob as performing 8-outcome measurements (via a
sequence of three 2-outcome measurements). However, since for any state the measurements al-
ways produce outputs satisfying the parity conditions, we can equivalently suppose Alice and Bob
measure to determine only (x0, x1) and (y0, y1), with the last bit for each determined by the parity
conditions. (This is consistent with the way we defined the magic square game earlier.) These are
4-outcome measurements that can be expressed in terms of the Π operators from Table 1 as
MMSx0x1|a = Π
x0
a0Π
x1
a1 N
MS
y0y1|b = Π
y0
0bΠ
y1
1b. (8)
It can be checked that each MMSx0x1|a and N
MS
y0y1|b is a rank-1 projector. Since the measurements for x0
and x1 (resp. y0 and y1) commute for every a (resp. b), the product of the Π operators in each case
can be taken in either order.
Certain nonlocal games exhibit the property that the quantum strategies achieving their opti-
mal values are essentially unique. That is, if a quantum strategy wins with probability within ε
of the optimal probability, that strategy must be δ(ε)-close to the ideal strategy for the game, up
to certain local operations. This property of rigidity or self-testing was shown first for the CHSH
game [MY98, MYS12] and has been shown for other nonlocal games since.
[WBMS16] originally gave a proof of the rigidity of a version of the magic square game which
is slightly different from ours. [CN16] showed that the rigidity statement also holds for the version
of the magic square game we use. However, both of these results show the self-testing of some
operators that are related to Alice and Bob’s measurement operators in the magic square game,
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but not the measurement operators themselves. It is not immediately clear how to self-test the
measurement operators themselves from their results. In Appendix B we derive the following
lemma for self-testing of the measurement operators of the magic square strategy.
Lemma 5. Consider any state |ρ〉 on registers XY and projective measurements Mx|a, Ny|b such that Mx|a
acts only on X and Ny|b acts only on Y . If this state and measurements win the magic square game with
probability 1− ε, then there exist local isometries VA : X → X0X1JA and VB : Y → Y0Y1JB and a state
|junk〉 on JAJB such that for all a, b, x, y, we have∥∥∥(VA ⊗VB) |ρ〉 − |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥
2
≤ O(ε1/4),∥∥∥(VA ⊗VB)(Mx|a ⊗ 1) |ρ〉 − ((MMSx|a ⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉)⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 ≤ O(ε1/4),∥∥∥(VA ⊗VB)(1⊗ Ny|b) |ρ〉 − ((1⊗ NMSy|b ) |ΨMS〉)⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 ≤ O(ε1/4),
where |ΨMS〉, MMSx|a , and NMSy|b denote the ideal state and measurements in the magic square game, as de-
scribed above.
3 On the security of Protocol 3 and Protocol 4
In this section we formulate the cheating probabilities as SDPs and solve them numerically to
get their values.
3.1 Security analysis of Protocol 3
In this section, we prove that when the devices are trusted in Protocol 3, then PXOTA = 1/2 and
PXOTB = 3/4. Before continuing, recall that Protocol 3 is an adaptation of the protocol in [CKS13]
where Alice’s actions are the exact same and so are the intentions of a dishonest Bob. Therefore,
we can import PXOTB = 3/4 directly from the security analysis of that protocol.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving PXOTA = 1/2. Since Bob never aborts, all
we need to ascertain is the ability for Alice to learn b from her information contained in the first
message. To do this, she must infer b from the ensemble{(
1
3
, ρb = TrY (|ψ+b 〉〈ψ+b |
)
: b ∈ {0, 1, 2}
}
. (9)
This is known as the quantum state discrimination problem, and the optimal guessing probability can
be written as the following SDP:
maximize :
1
3
2
∑
b=0
Tr(Ebρb)
subject to: E0 + E1 + E2 = 1
E0, E1, E2 ∈ Pos(X ).
(10)
Note that the success probability can be seen to be given by this SDP as it is a maximization over
POVMs and the objective function is the probability of that POVM measurement producing the
correct guess for b.
Solving this SDP yields an optimal value of 1/2.
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3.2 Security analysis of Protocol 4
We split this section up into the four cases, depending on whether or not the state is trusted at
the beginning, and each cheating party. The cheating probabilities in Theorem 2 are obtained by
solving the SDPs obtained in each case.
Cheating strategy formulation set-up. Recall that Alice and Bob’s ideal measurement operators
in the magic square game are denoted by MMSx0x1|a and N
MS
y0y1|b. The measurement corresponding to
a may be performed by applying a unitary that takes the {MMSx0x1|a}x0x1 basis to the computational
basis, and then measuring in the computational basis. We denote this unitary by Ua for each input
a to Alice. Similarly, the measurement corresponding to b can be performed by applying Ub and
then measuring in the computational basis.
3.2.1 Untrusted state, cheating Bob
In Protocol 4, Bob cheats successfully if he is able to output (x0, x1) at the end of the protocol
and Alice does not abort in step 5. We shall model the classical registers as quantum registers in the
following argument. Steps 3–5 can then be modelled as follows: Alice produces a superposition
of the three values of a in a register (with a copy she can send to Bob), then performs Ua on
X0X1 conditioned on this register and measures it to determine a. The steps of Protocol 4 that are
relevant for determining whether Bob cheats successfully can then be described as follows:
1. Bob sends two qubit registers Y0Y1 to Alice.
2. Alice prepares the state
|φ3〉AA′ =
1√
3
(|00〉AA′ + |11〉AA′ + |22〉AA′), (11)
and sends A′ to Bob.
3. Bob sends his guess gB for (x0, x1) to Alice in the two-qubit register GB.
4. Alice performs Ua on X0X1 conditioned on a in A. The event of Bob cheating successfully is
then determined by a computational-basis joint measurement on AX0Y0X1Y1GB.
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be Alice’s states at the end of steps 2 and 5 respectively, which are on registers
X0Y0X1Y1 and AX0Y0X1Y1GB respectively. They are required to satisfy
TrGB(ρ2) = TrA′ (ρ1 ⊗ |φ3〉〈φ3|) = ρ1 ⊗
1A
3
. (12)
In step 6, Alice performs a controlled unitary on registers AX0X1 given by
UAX0X1 = ∑
a=0,1,2
|a〉〈a|A ⊗ (Ua)X0X1 . (13)
A measurement is then performed on AX0Y0X1Y1GB to determine whether Bob cheats success-
fully. Letting PY0Y1A denote the projector
PY0Y1A = |10〉〈10|Y0Y1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|A + |01〉〈01|Y0Y1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|A
+ |00〉〈00|Y0Y1 ⊗ |2〉〈2|A + |11〉〈11|Y0Y1 ⊗ 1A, (14)
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the projector corresponding to Bob cheating successfully is 1− Erej, where
Erej = |00〉〈00|X0X1 ⊗
PY0Y1A ⊗ 1GB + (1Y0Y1A1 − PY0Y1A)⊗ ∑
(x′0,x′1) 6=(0,0)
|x′0x′1〉〈x′0x′1|GB

+ ∑
(x0,x1) 6=(0,0)
(x′0,x′1) 6=(x0,x1)
|x0x1〉〈x0x1|X0X1 ⊗ 1Y0Y1A ⊗ |x′0x′1〉〈x′0x′1|GB . (15)
Dishonest Bob wants to maximize Tr((1 − Erej)UAX0X1ρ2U†AX0X1) = Tr(E′accρ2), where E′acc =
U†AX0X1(1− Erej)UAX0X1 . Hence we can conclude Bob’s maximum cheating probability is bounded
above by the following SDP:
maximize : Tr(E′accρ2)
subject to : TrGB(ρ2) = ρ1 ⊗
1A
3
Tr(ρ1) = 1
ρ1 ∈ Pos(X0Y0X1Y1)
ρ2 ∈ Pos(AX0Y0X1Y1GB).
(16)
For the purposes of numerically solving the primal, one can enforce that the registersAY0Y1GB are
classical (i.e. diagonal in the computational basis), since the objective function and constraints are
unaffected by setting off-diagonal terms in those registers to zero. This allows dramatically faster
solving of the SDP, since it eliminates many variables. In addition, the optimization variables can
be assumed to have real-valued entries, since the constraints and objective function are described
by real-valued coefficients.
Solving the SDP numerically yields a value of 0.94096.
3.2.2 Trusted state, cheating Bob
We note that the only thing changed by the fact that the state is trusted is that we have an
extra constraint on ρ1, namely TrY0Y1(ρ1) =
1X0X1
4 . (Even though the whole initial state is trusted,
Bob can apply arbitrary operations on his side and the initial joint state is pure, hence there is no
loss of tightness in our bounds by only imposing a constraint on Alice’s side of it.) Note that this
automatically takes care of the Tr(ρ1) = 1 constraint. Hence, Bob’s cheating probability in this
case is bounded by the following SDP:
maximize : Tr(E′accρ2)
subject to : TrGB(ρ2) = ρ1 ⊗
1A
3
TrY0Y1(ρ1) =
1X0X1
4
ρ1 ∈ Pos(X0Y0X1Y1)
ρ2 ∈ Pos(AX0Y0X1Y1GB).
(17)
Solving this SDP numerically yields a value of 0.93628.
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3.2.3 Untrusted state, cheating Alice
Alice sends some state in registers Y0Y1 (possibly while retaining a purification of the state)
to Bob, who carries out the measurement {MMSy0y1|b}y0y1 on it, and sends the outcome y0y1 back to
Alice in the computational basis of a register Y . So honest Bob performs one of the three channels
Φb(σ) = ∑
y0y1
Tr(NMSy0y1|bσ) |y0y1〉〈y0y1|Y , (18)
each with probability 13 , and cheating Alice wants to learn which which channel he has performed.
This is a channel discrimination problem, and it can be shown using the reasoning in [GW07,
Wat09] that the optimal success probability is given by the optimal value of the following SDP:
maximize :
1
3
2
∑
b=0
Tr(Qb J(Φb))
subject to :
2
∑
b=0
Qb = 1Y ⊗ σ
Tr(σ) = 1
σ ∈ Pos(X ), ∀b Qb ∈ Pos(X )
(19)
where X is an isomorphic copy of Y0Y1 and J(Φb) is the Choi matrix for the channel Φb, which is
in Herm(YX ) and given by
J(Φb) = ∑
b=0,1,2
|y0y1〉〈y0y1|Y ⊗ NMSy0y1|b. (20)
Solving the SDP numerically yields a value of 0.87268.
3.2.4 Trusted state, cheating Alice
Suppose Bob performs the measurement corresponding to input b on his half of the state,
receiving an outcome which he sends to Alice by encoding it in the computational basis of a
register Y . Since the initial state is trusted, the state Alice then holds is
ρb = ∑
y0y1
TrY0Y1((1⊗ NMSy0y1|b) |ΨMS〉〈ΨMS| (1⊗ NMSy0y1|b))⊗ |y0y1〉〈y0y1|Y . (21)
Alice has to distinguish these states (for the three possible values of b), and hence her cheating
probability is given by the state discrimination SDP:
maximize :
1
3
2
∑
b=0
Tr(Ebρb)
subject to : E0 + E1 + E2 = 1XY
E0, E1, E2 ∈ Pos(X0X1Y).
(22)
Solving the SDP numerically yields a value of 0.83333. Note that this value is a bit smaller than
the case when the state is untrusted, as should be expected.
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4 Numerically bounding the cheating probabilities for Protocol 5
In this section, we obtain expressions for Alice and Bob’s cheating probabilities in Protocol 5,
which can be optimized using the NPA hierarchy. Throughout the section we shall often omit
some tensor factors of 1 for brevity (e.g. for an operator M on Alice’s system and an operator N
on Bob’s system, MN implicitly means (M⊗ 1)(1⊗ N)).
Without loss of generality, we assume the state shared by the two parties is pure, by giving
the dishonest party the purification of any mixed state. We can also assume the input and output
spaces of all the measurement operators are the same (if the spaces were different, we could simply
view all of them as being embedded in a common Hilbert space; for instance the direct sum of all
the Hilbert spaces3). By Lemma 10 (see Appendix C), we can also assume all measurements are
projective4.
Cheating Bob. Bob never calls for a test if he is dishonest, since if he does so then he must
either abort or perform a protocol perfectly secure against him. Hence we can consider only two
families of measurement choices that dishonest Bob’s box may perform — one that is used if Bob
sends Alice his box and she runs the test, and one that Bob uses himself in the subroutine running
Protocol 4. Since Alice is honest, she uses the same measurements in both situations, although Bob
could have preprogrammed what measurement is performed by Alice’s box for a given input. We
have used aA, bA, xA, yA to denote the inputs and outputs when Alice runs the test; here we shall
use a, b, x, y to denote the variables when the Protocol 4 subroutine is ran.
Let Alice and Bob’s shared pure state be |ρ〉, and let ρ = |ρ〉〈ρ|. Let Alice’s measurement
operators on her system for input a and output x be denoted by Mx|a and Bob’s test measure-
ment operators on his system for input bA and output yA be denoted by NtestyA|bA . The probability
of outputs xA, yA on inputs aA, bA by Alice during the test is given by
∥∥∥MxA|aA NtestyA|bA |ρ〉∥∥∥2 =
Tr(MxA|aA NtestyA|bAρ), since we assumed the measurements are projective. Bob’s cheating probability
when Alice runs the test is just his probability of passing the test, since he can guess x perfectly if
he passes the test. Since honest Alice picks the testing inputs aA, bA uniformly, Bob’s probability
of passing the test is given by
PtestB =
1
9 ∑
aA,bA=0,1,2
∑
xA,yA :xA
bA
=yA
aA
Tr(MxA|aA N
test
yA|bAρ). (23)
Let Bob’s measurement operators when Alice does not run the test be denoted by Nprot. There
are two kinds of measurement operators here — Bob performs a measurement with no input to
generate the y that he sends to Alice in step 2 of the Protocol 4 subroutine; these measurement
operators will be denoted by Nproty . The subnormalized shared state after Bob performs this mea-
surement is given by Nproty ρN
prot
y . After receiving Alice’s input a as a message from Alice, Bob
3Technically, the measurement operators must be modified to ensure the POVM elements still sum to the identity
on this space, but this is fairly straightforward (similar to the construction in Eq. (68)).
4In the case of cheating Alice, it is a standard Bell-nonlocality scenario, in which case this is a known result (via a
simpler version of the construction in Appendix C). For cheating Bob, however, some of the measurements are sequen-
tial and hence more care is needed, since it was found in [BMKG13] that there exist sequential correlations that cannot
be described by projective measurements.
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performs another measurement to produce his guess g for Alice’s output x. Since the only infor-
mation he learns from Alice is a, he uses this as his input and applies a measurement operator
Nprotg|a . The probability of Alice outputting x on input a and Bob outputting g on input a and send-
ing y at the beginning is given by
∥∥∥Mx|aNprotg|a Nproty |ρ〉∥∥∥2 = Tr(Mx|aNprotg|a Nproty ρNproty ). Alice picks
her input a uniformly at random and Bob cheats successfully in this case if y, a and x are compat-
ible (in the Protocol 4 subroutine) and his guess satisfies g = x. Hence Bob’s cheating probability
is given by
PprotB =
1
3
Tr
(
M00|0N
prot
00|0 (N
prot
00 ρN
prot
00 + N
prot
01 ρN
prot
00 ) + M00|1N
prot
00|1 (N
prot
00 ρN
prot
00 + N
prot
10 ρN
prot
10 )
+ M00|2N
prot
00|2 (N
prot
01 ρN
prot
01 + N
prot
10 ρN
prot
10 ) + ∑
a=0,1,2
∑
x 6=00
∑
y
Mx|aN
prot
x|a N
prot
y ρN
prot
y
)
. (24)
Using the fact that Mx|a and N
prot
y act on different systems, the terms in the above expression can be
rewritten in the form Tr(Mx|aN
prot
y N
prot
x|a N
prot
y ρ), which are terms in the NPA matrix. Bob’s overall
cheating probability is given by the maximum value (over all possible states and measurements
as described above) of
qAPtestB + (1− qA)PprotB . (25)
Cheating Alice. Here we similarly assume dishonest Alice has measurement operators Mprot
that are applied in her box when the Protocol 4 subroutine is ran, and measurement operators
Mtest that are applied when Bob tests with Alice’s box. Bob’s measurement operators Ny|b are the
same throughout. As in Bob’s case, Alice’s cheating probability when Bob runs the test is given by
PtestA =
1
9 ∑
aA,bA=0,1,2
∑
xA,yA :xA
bA
=yA
aA
Tr(MtestxA|aA NyA|bAρ). (26)
The only information Alice gets from Bob in the Protocol 4 subroutine is Bob’s output y. She
uses this to choose a measurement to perform on her state, which produces an output g that is her
guess for Bob’s input. This corresponds to a measurement operator Mprotg|y , and the probability of
Bob producing output y on input b and Alice producing output g on message y from Bob is given
by Tr(Mprotg|y Ny|bρ). Since honest Bob chooses his input b uniformly, and Alice cheats successfully
if her guess satisfies g = b, her cheating probability in this case is given by
PprotA =
1
3 ∑b=0,1,2
∑
y
Tr(Mprotb|y Ny|bρ). (27)
Alice’s overall cheating probability is given by the maximum value of
qBPtestA + (1− qB)PprotA . (28)
Using the NPA hierarchy. The bound on PXOTA in Theorem 3 was computed by using NPA local
level 1 to optimize Eq. (28).5 For PXOTB , we need to optimize Eq. (25), and higher-order moments
5In principle, it could have been simpler to compute a bound using only the no-signalling constraints, as was done
in part of the security proof in [SCA+11]. However, here we encountered the issue that non-signalling strategies that
perfectly win the magic square game are not unique, and can even produce deterministic outcomes for one input pair.
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are required due to the sequential measurements. Hence we choose the index set O to be
O = ({1} ∪ {Mx|a}) ◦ ({1} ∪ {Ntesty|b } ∪ {Nprotg|m } ∪ {N
prot
y } ∪ {Nprotg|m N
prot
y }), (29)
where ◦means all pairwise word concatenations between the two sets in order (and 1 is the empty
word). However, this matrix is very large if measurement operators for all outcomes are included,
and hence we omitted one projector per measurement by using the relation∑x Mx|a = ∑y Ny|b = 1
to eliminate M11|a, N11|b from the objective function. Omitting these terms from the index set O as
well, its size is reduced to a more manageable |O| = (1+ 9)(1+ 9+ 9+ 3+ 27) = 490.
The results from solving these SDPs numerically are stated in Theorem 3.
5 Analytically bounding the cheating probabilities away from 1 for
Protocol 5
We shall show the security proof for cheating Bob only (the proof for cheating Alice is anal-
ogous, though simpler because there are no sequential measurements by Alice). We start by
first proving the following lemma, which formalizes the intuition that in order to show PXOTB is
bounded away from 1 in Protocol 5, it would be sufficient to argue that if Bob passes Alice’s test
with high probability, then he cannot cheat perfectly in the “protocol branch”.
Lemma 6. Consider any qA ∈ (0, 1). Suppose there exists some ε > 0 such that the value of
sup PprotB
subject to: PtestB ≥ 1− ε
is upper-bounded by 1− ε/(1− qA), where PprotB , PtestB are defined as in Eqs. (23)–(24), and the supremum
is taken over all states and measurements. Then for Protocol 5 performed with that choice of qA, we have
PXOTB ≤ 1− qAε.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that PXOTB > 1− qAε. Then by Eq. (25), this must be achieved by
Bob implementing a strategy such that
PtestB >
1− qAε− (1− qA)PprotB
qA
≥ 1− q
Aε− (1− qA)(1)
qA
= 1− ε. (30)
By hypothesis, this implies that PprotB ≤ 1− ε/(1− qA). But this would imply
PXOTB ≤ qA(1) + (1− qA)
(
1− ε
1− qA
)
= 1− ε < 1− qAε, (31)
contradicting the supposition that PXOTB > 1− qAε.
We now use the rigidity properties of the magic square game to prove (for any fixed choice
of qA) there indeed exists some ε > 0 fulfilling the conditions of this lemma, and thus PXOTB is
bounded by some constant strictly less than 1. To do so, we first note that our device-dependent
arguments directly yield the following lemma, which we shall use later.
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Lemma 7. Let |ΨMS〉 and MMSx|a be the ideal state and measurements (for Alice) in the magic square game.
If Alice and Bob share a state of the form |ρ〉 = |ΨMS〉X0X1Y0Y1 ⊗ |junk〉JAJB , and Alice’s measurements on
X0X1JA are of the form Mx|a = MMSx|a ⊗ 1JA , then for any measurements N
prot
g|m , N
prot
y by Bob on Y0Y1JB,
we have
PprotB ≤ 0.93628,
where PprotB is defined as in Eq. (24).
Proof. Since Alice’s measurements act as the identity on JA, we may as well suppose Bob holds
that system. Recall that our device-dependent arguments allowed the cheating party to perform
arbitrary operations on their state. In particular, cheating Bob could append an ancilla |junk〉JAJB
and perform a joint measurement across this ancilla and his part of the state. Hence our bounds
for the trusted-state-and-measurements scenario apply to the situation described here.
Consider an arbitrary ε > 0, and consider any cheating strategy for Bob in Protocol 5 that
achieves PtestB ≥ 1− ε. Then by Lemma 5, we have∥∥∥(VA Mx|a ⊗VB) |ρ〉 − ((MMSx|a ⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉)⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 ≤ O(ε1/4). (32)
Before proceeding further, we give an informal overview of our subsequent argument. Quali-
tatively, Eq. (32) means the (subnormalized) true post-Alice-measurement states are close to the
ideal post-Alice-measurement states of the magic square game, up to local isometries/ancillas.
We shall hence argue that after Bob performs his true measurements Nprotg|m , N
prot
y on the true post-
Alice-measurement states, the resulting states are close to those that would result from Bob per-
forming some other measurements N˜protg|m , N˜
prot
y on the ideal post-Alice-measurement states (up to
local isometries/ancillas), upon which our desired result quickly follows by observing that the
latter is precisely a situation where Lemma 7 applies. Roughly speaking, these measurements
N˜protg|m , N˜
prot
y will be constructed from the true measurements N
prot
g|m , N
prot
y by simply “inverting” the
isometries mapping the true states to the ideal ones, giving us measurements that act on the ideal
systems rather than the true ones. However, since isometries are not in general invertible, we shall
need to account for some technical details while doing so.6
We now give the rigorous proof. As previously described, we take the input and output spaces
of all the true measurement operators to be the same. In that case, we can define measurement
operators N˜proty , N˜
prot
g|m on Y0Y1JB via
N˜proty = VBN
prot
y V†B +
ΠVB
2
and N˜protg|m = VBN
prot
g|m V
†
B +
ΠVB
2
(33)
where ΠVB = 1Y0Y1JB − VBV†B . It is easy to verify that ΠVB is a projector and satisfies V†BΠVB = 0,
ΠVB VB = 0. The operators N˜
prot
y form a valid set of measurement operators on Y0Y1JB, since
N˜prot †y N˜
prot
y =
(
VBN
prot †
y V†B +
ΠVB
2
)(
VBN
prot
y V†B +
ΠVB
2
)
= VBN
prot †
y N
prot
y V†B +
ΠVB
4
, (34)
6An alternate perspective that may be helpful is that an isometry simply defines an embedding of Hilbert spaces,
i.e. we can choose bases such that V |φ〉 = |φ〉 ⊕ 0 in explicit components. We can thus think of Eq. (32) as the statement∥∥∥((Mx|a ⊗ 1) |ρ〉)⊕ 0− ((MMSx|a ⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉)⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 ≤ O(ε1/4) in some choice of coordinates, in which case the
subsequent construction is fairly intuitive.
20
which implies they sum to the identity on Y0Y1JB. Similarly, for each m, the operators N˜protg|m form
a valid set of measurement operators.
The “sequential operators” N˜protg|m N˜
prot
y thus also form a valid set of measurement operators,
i.e. we have ∑gy(N˜
prot
g|m N˜
prot
y )
†N˜protg|m N˜
prot
y = 1Y0Y1JB (for all m). This implies that for any (not neces-
sarily normalized) |ν〉 ∈ X0X1Y0Y1JAJB, we have
∥∥∥(1X0X1JA ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty ) |ν〉∥∥∥2 ≤ ‖|ν〉‖2. Addi-
tionally, we note that
N˜protg|m N˜
prot
y VB =
(
VBN
prot
g|m V
†
B +
ΠVB
2
)(
VBN
prot
y V†B +
ΠVB
2
)
VB = VBN
prot
g|m N
prot
y . (35)
Applying these properties to Eq. (32), followed by the reverse triangle inequality, we finally obtain
the following (denoting MMSx|a ⊗ 1JA = M˜MSx|a ):
O(ε1/4) ≥
∥∥∥(VA Mx|a ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty VB) |ρ〉 − (M˜MSx|a ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty ) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥(VA Mx|a ⊗VBNprotg|m Nproty ) |ρ〉 − (M˜MSx|a ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty ) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2
≥
∣∣∣ ∥∥∥(VA Mx|a ⊗VBNprotg|m Nproty ) |ρ〉∥∥∥2 − ∥∥∥(M˜MSx|a ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty ) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ ∥∥∥(Mx|a ⊗ Nprotg|m Nproty ) |ρ〉∥∥∥2 − ∥∥∥(M˜MSx|a ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty ) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 ∣∣∣ . (36)
Recall that PprotB is a sum of terms of the form
∥∥∥(Mx|a ⊗ Nprotg|m Nproty ) |ρ〉∥∥∥2. Let P˜protB be the value ob-
tained by replacing these terms with
∥∥∥(M˜MSx|a ⊗ N˜protg|m N˜proty ) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥2 instead. Since this
is the sum of finitely many terms, Eq. (36) implies that PprotB ≤ P˜protB + O(ε1/4). In addition,
Lemma 7 implies that P˜protB ≤ 0.93628. Hence we conclude that by choosing sufficiently small
ε > 0, we would have PprotB ≤ 0.93628 +O(ε1/4) ≤ 1− ε/(1− qA), which satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 6.
Remark 5. In principle, this approach can yield analytical bounds on PXOTB by explicitly tracking the
constants in the O(ε1/4) bound. However, the results of [WBMS16] show that this O(ε1/4) self-testing
bound becomes trivial at very small values of ε (less than 10−4, for our definition of ε). We found that if
the optimization in Lemma 6 is solved numerically using the NPA hierarchy instead of using this analytical
bound, the results appear much more robust — for instance, at ε = 10−3 we still get a nontrivial bound
of PprotB ≤ 0.97365. Hence this indicates that the analytical approach here yields bounds that are quite far
from tight. (Solving the analogous optimization for cheating Alice yields tighter bounds as compared to
cheating Bob; e.g. PprotA ≤ 0.85855 at ε = 10−3 and PprotA ≤ 0.83590 at ε = 10−5.)
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A Background: The NPA hierarchy
In this appendix, we briefly explain the NPA hierarchy as used in Section 4. The NPA hier-
archy [NPA08] is a method to characterize the set of quantum behaviours, which are defined to be
distributions that can be written as
Pr(xy|ab) = 〈ν|Mx|aNy|b |ν〉 , (37)
where |ν〉 is a state in a Hilbert space H and {Mx|a}x∈X,a∈A, {Ny|b}y∈Y,b∈B are sets of operators on
H satisfying the following properties:
M†x|a = Mx|a and N
†
y|b = Ny|b,
Mx|a Mx′|a = δxx′Mx|a and Ny|bNy′|b = δyy′Ny|b,
∑
x∈X
Mx|a = 1 and ∑
y∈Y
Ny|b = 1 ∀a, b,
[Mx|a, Ny|b] = 0 ∀x, y, a, b.
(38)
Such distributions can be produced, for instance, by projective measurements on the subsystems
of a tensor product of two Hilbert spaces7, as we are studying in this work. The NPA hierarchy
consists of an infinite sequence of SDP conditions on Pr(xy|ab) which are all satisfied if and only
if it is a quantum behaviour.
Specifically, let O denote any finite list of finite-length words formed by letters from the alpha-
bet {Mx|a}x∈X,a∈A ∪ {Ny|b}y∈Y,b∈B, and let Oj denote the jth element of O. It is not hard to show
that if we have a state and operators satisfying the conditions in Eq. (38), then any |O| × |O|matrix
Γ with entries given by
Γjk = 〈ν|O†j Ok |ν〉 , (39)
interpreting the words as the corresponding operators on H, must be positive semidefinite. In
particular, if Pr(xy|ab) is a quantum behaviour, then some of the entries of Γ correspond to values
of Pr(xy|ab), hence imposing an SDP constraint on this distribution. Additional constraints on Γ
can be imposed based on the relations in Eq. (38).
We hence see that any choice of O yields an SDP characterization of a superset of the set of
quantum behaviours (this is sufficient to yield upper bounds on the cheating probabilities we
consider in this work). A sequence of increasingly tight bounds can be obtained via appropriate
choices of O. Specifically, if O is chosen to be the set of all words of length at most k, this will
be referred to as global level k of the NPA hierarchy. It was shown in [NPA08] that if a distribu-
tion Pr(xy|ab) satisfies the SDP constraint at global level k for all k, then it must be a quantum
behaviour. Hence the hierarchy describes a sequence of increasingly smaller sets that eventually
converge to the set of quantum behaviours.
7While every distribution achievable on such a tensor-product space can easily be expressed in the form (37), the
converse is not necessarily true. However, the former property implies the NPA hierarchy characterizes a superset of
the distributions we consider, which is sufficient for our goal of upper bounding the cheating probabilities — though
the bounds may not be tight.
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As a slight variation, one can also consider local level k, which refers to taking O to be the set
of all words with at most k letters from {Mx|a}x∈X,a∈A and at most k letters from {Ny|b}y∈Y,b∈B.
(Basically, local level k defines a slightly smaller O than global level 2k.) Our results are based on
local level 1 of the hierarchy or slight extensions thereof (see Section 4). In addition, in our work
we need to consider sequential measurements, which are not directly covered by the above de-
scription. However, as we discuss in Section 4, the probabilities produced by such measurements
can also be expressed as elements of the matrix Γ and can be assumed projective, hence we can
bound them using this approach.
B Proof of Lemma 5
In this appendix we prove the rigidity lemma needed for the proof of our fully device-independent
protocol. Again, in this section we often leave some tensor factors of 1 implicit.
Following [CN16], we define the following operators from the ideal measurements of the
magic square game
XMS1 = ∑
x0x1
(−1)x1 MMSx0x1|1, XMS2 = ∑
x0x1
(−1)x0 MMSx0x1|1,
ZMS1 = ∑
x0x1
(−1)x0 MMSx0x1|0, ZMS2 = ∑
x0x1
(−1)x1 MMSx0x1|0,
XMS3 = ∑
y0y1
(−1)y1 NMSy0y1|1, XMS4 = ∑
y0y1
(−1)y1 NMSy0y1|0,
ZMS3 = ∑
y0y1
(−1)y0 NMSy0y1|0, ZMS4 = ∑
y0y1
(−1)y0 NMSy0y1|1,
WMS1 = ∑
x0x1
(−1)x0 MMSx0x1|2, WMS2 = ∑
x0x1
(−1)x1 MMSx0x1|2,
WMS3 = ∑
y0y1
(−1)y0 NMSy0y1|2, WMS4 = ∑
y0y1
(−1)y1 NMSy0y1|2.
(40)
Xk, Zk, Wk are defined similarly from the actual measurement operators Mx0x1|a, Ny0y1|b used by
Alice and Bob.
Both [WBMS16] and [CN16] use the following lemma due to McKague, which we shall also
need.
Lemma 8 ([McK17]). Suppose |ρ〉 is a state onXY and {X1, X2}, {Z1, Z2} are sets of Hermitian, unitary,
commuting operators acting only on X , and {X3, X4}, {Z3, Z4} are sets of Hermitian, unitary, commuting
operators acting only on Y , such that for all k 6= l,
‖(XkZl − ZlXk) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ δ
‖(Xk − Zk+2) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ δ
‖(XkZk + ZkXk) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ δ.
For p, q ∈ {0, 1}4, let Xp = ∏4i=1 Xpii and let Zq, (XMS)p, (ZMS)q be defined similarly. Then, there exist
isometries VA : X → X0X1JA and VB : Y → Y0Y1JB such that for any p, q ∈ {0, 1}4,∥∥∥(VA ⊗VB)(XpZq) |ρ〉 − (XMS)p(ZMS)q |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉∥∥∥
2
≤ O(
√
δ).
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Suppose the state |ρ〉 and measurements Mx|a, Ny|b win the magic square game with probabil-
ity 1− ε. Let pab denote the probability that this strategy wins when Alice and Bob’s inputs are a
and b. Since the inputs are uniformly distributed, this means that 19 ∑a,b pab = 1− ε. Since every
probability is upper bounded by 1, for any fixed a, b we have,
pab = 9(1− ε)− ∑
(a′,b′) 6=(a,b)
pa′b′ ≥ 9(1− ε)− 8 ≥ 1− 9ε. (41)
This implies that
〈ν|X1X3|ν〉 = ∑
x0x1y0y1
(−1)x1+y1〈ν|Mx0x1|1Ny0y1|1|ν〉 = p11 − (1− p11) ≥ 1− 18ε. (42)
Similarly, using the lower bound on pab for other values of a, b we get
〈ρ|X2X4|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (43)
〈ρ|X1X2W4|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (44)
〈ρ|Z1Z3|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (45)
〈ρ|Z2Z4|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (46)
〈ρ|Z1Z2W3|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (47)
−〈ρ|W1X4Z3|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (48)
−〈ρ|W2X3Z4|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε (49)
−〈ρ|W1W2W3W4|ρ〉 ≥ 1− 18ε. (50)
Using these relations, we can show that ‖(X1Z1 + Z1X1) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ O(
√
ε), following [WBMS16,
CN16]. (The argument basically relies on a sequence of bounds obtained in the same way as
Eq. (55) below.) Similarly, we can show that all the conditions for Lemma 8 hold for the Xk, Zk
operators, and hence the conclusion of the lemma holds with a bound of O(ε1/4).
Now, consider the cases p = 1000, 0100, 1100 with q being 0000 in all cases in the statement of
the lemma. Using the definitions of X1 and X2 we have,
‖(VA ⊗VB)((M00|1 −M01|1 + M10|1 −M11|1)⊗ 1) |ρ〉
− ((MMS00|1 −MMS01|1 + MMS10|1 −MMS11|1)⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉‖2 ≤ O(ε1/4) (51)
‖(VA ⊗VB)((M00|1 + M01|1 −M10|1 −M11|1)⊗ 1) |ρ〉
− ((MMS00|1 + MMS01|1 −MMS10|1 −MMS11|1)⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉‖2 ≤ O(ε1/4) (52)
‖(VA ⊗VB)((M00|1 −M01|1 −M10|1 + M11|1)⊗ 1) |ρ〉
− ((MMS00|1 −MMS01|1 −MMS10|1 + MMS11|1)⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉‖2 ≤ O(ε1/4) (53)
where in the last inequality we have simplified X1X2 using the fact that the Mx0x1|1, M
MS
x0x1|1 opera-
tors are orthogonal projectors. Moreover, both the Mx0x1|1 and M
MS
x0x1|1 operators must sum to the
identity on their respective spaces, which implies (via the p = q = 0000 case) that
‖(VA ⊗VB)((M00|1 + M01|1 + M10|1 + M11|1)⊗ 1) |ρ〉
− ((MMS00|1 + MMS01|1 + MMS10|1 + MMS11|1)⊗ 1) |ΨMS〉 ⊗ |junk〉‖2 ≤ O(ε1/4). (54)
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Eqs. (51)–(54) involve linearly independent combinations of the Mx0x1|1 operators (and the corre-
sponding ones for MMSx0x1|1). Hence from linear combinations of these we can self-test the Mx0x1|1
operators, by applying the triangle inequality.
Similarly, MMSx0x1|0 measurement can be self-tested by taking p = 0000 with q = 1000, 0100, 1100,
and using the fact that MMSx0x1|0 sum to identity. For self-testing N
MS
y0y1|1 we take the equations for
(p = 0010, q = 0000), (p = 0000, q = 0001), (p = 0010, q = 0001), with the identity condition.
And finally for NMSy0y1|0 we take (p = 0001, q = 0000), (p = 0000, q = 0010), (p = 0001, q = 0010)
with the identity condition.
To self-test the Ny0y1|2 operators, note that from Eq. (44),
‖(W4 − X1X2) |ρ〉‖22 = 〈ρ|W24 |ρ〉+ 〈ρ|(X1X2)2|ρ〉 − 〈ρ|W4X1X2|ρ〉 − 〈ρ|X1X2W4|ρ〉
= 2− 2〈ρ|X1X2W4|ρ〉 ≤ 2− 2(1− 18ε) = 36ε, (55)
where we have used the fact that W4 and X1X2 square to identity by construction, and they also
commute due to acting on only Alice and Bob’s registers respectively. Using Eq. (47) similarly we
have,
‖(W3 − Z1Z2) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ O(
√
ε) (56)
‖(W4 − X1X2) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ O(
√
ε). (57)
Now, using the fact that ‖W3‖∞ , ‖X1X2‖∞ = 1, and W3, W4 commute with X1, X2, Z1, Z2,
‖(W3W4 − X1X2Z1Z2) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ ‖W3(W4 − X1X2) |ρ〉‖2 + ‖(W3X1X2 − X1X2Z1Z2) |ρ〉‖2
≤ ‖(W4 − X1X2) |ρ〉‖2 + ‖X1X2(W3 − Z1Z2) |ρ〉‖2
≤ ‖(W4 − X1X2) |ρ〉‖2 + ‖(W3 − Z1Z2) |ρ〉‖2
≤ O(√ε). (58)
We have already seen the self-testing of the X1X2 and Z1Z2 operators. Taking (p = 1100, q =
1100) in Lemma 8 lets us self-test X1X2Z1Z2. Moreover, since the ideal magic square state and
measurements win the magic square game perfectly, they must satisfy analogous relations with
ε = 0, i.e. we have
ZMS1 Z
MS
2 |ΨMS〉 = WMS3 |ΨMS〉 , XMS1 XMS2 |ΨMS〉 = WMS4 |ΨMS〉 ,
XMS1 X
MS
2 Z
MS
1 Z
MS
2 |ΨMS〉 = WMS3 WMS4 |ΨMS〉 .
(59)
Using these, Eqs. (56)–(58) and the fact that the Ny0y1|2 operators add to identity lets us self-test
this measurement.
Finally, to self-test the Mx0x1|2 operators, we note that using Eqs. (48)–(50) we get,
‖(W1 + X4Z3) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ O(
√
ε) (60)
‖(W2 + X3Z4) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ O(
√
ε) (61)
‖(W1W2 +W3W4) |ρ〉‖2 ≤ O(
√
ε). (62)
The ideal magic square state and measurements satisfy
XMS4 Z
MS
3 |ΨMS〉 = −WMS1 |ΨMS〉 XMS3 ZMS4 |ΨMS〉 = −WMS2 |ΨMS〉
WMS3 W
MS
4 |ΨMS〉 = −WMS1 WMS2 |ΨMS〉 .
(63)
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Using these, Eqs. (60)–(62), the statement of Lemma 8 for (p = 0001, q = 0010), (p = 0010, q =
0001), the self-testing of W3W4 that we have already seen, and the identity condition for Mx0x1|2,
we can self-test this measurement. This completes the list of all self-testing statements in Lemma 5.
C Dilation to projective measurements
In this appendix, we prove the claim in Section 4 that we can assume the measurements are
projective without loss of generality. Again, in this section we often leave some tensor factors of 1
implicit.
First, to handle a dilation of isometries to unitaries that we will need if the systems are infinite-
dimensional, we prove a useful lemma based on the Sz.-Nagy dilation for an isometry.
Lemma 9. Consider a set of isometries Vj : H0 → Hj for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and another set of isometries
V ′k : Hn → Kk for k = 1, 2, . . . , m. Let L =
⊕n
j=0Hj ⊕
⊕m
k=1Kk, and view all Hj and Kk as subspaces
of L. Then there exist unitaries {Uj}nj=1 on L such that for any |ν〉 ∈ H0, we have Vj |ν〉 = Uj |ν〉 ∈ Hj.
There also exist unitaries {U′k}mk=1 on L such that for any |µ〉 ∈ Hn, we have V ′k |µ〉 = U′k |µ〉 ∈ Kk.
Proof. For brevity, we only prove the case for n = m = 2; the construction for more isometries
is precisely analogous. For any isometry V with some domain H, we define the operator ΠV =
1H −VV†, which can be easily shown to be a projector satisfying V†ΠV = ΠVV = 0. Let
U1 =

0H0 −V†1
V1 ΠV1
1H2
1K1⊕K2
 , U2 =

0H0 −V†2
1H1
V2 ΠV2
1K1⊕K2
 ,
U′1 =

1H0⊕H1
0H2 −V ′†1
V ′1 ΠV′1
1K2
 , U′2 =

1H0⊕H1
0H2 −V ′†2
1K1
V ′2 ΠV′2
 .
(64)
A direct calculation shows that these operators are indeed unitary and satisfy the desired property,
e.g. for U1 we have
U†1 U1 =

0H0 V
†
1
−V1 ΠV1
1H2
1K1⊕K2


0H0 −V†1
V1 ΠV1
1H2
1K1⊕K2

=

0H0 +V
†
1 V 0H0 +V
†
1 ΠV1
0H0 +ΠV1V1 V1V
†
1 +ΠV1
1H2
1K1⊕K2

= 1H0⊕H1⊕H2⊕K1⊕K2 (65)
and
U1 |ν〉 =

0H0 −V†1
V1 ΠV1
1H2
1K1⊕K2


|ν〉
0H1
0H2
0K1⊕K2
 =

0H0
V1 |ν〉
0H2
0K1⊕K2
 . (66)
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Remark 6. The construction in the above proof easily generalizes in several ways, for instance if one allows
some of the isometries to have the same codomain, or if another set of isometries could be applied after V ′k .
We now prove the claim that the measurements can be assumed projective without loss of
generality, stated as the following lemma:
Lemma 10. For any state ρ and POVMs attaining some value for Bob’s cheating probability (as expressed
in Eq. (25)), there is another state ρ¯ and projective measurements (PVMs) that attain the same value. An
analogous statement holds for Alice’s cheating probability (as expressed in Eq. (28)).
Proof. We describe the proof for cheating Bob only (the proof for cheating Alice is analogous,
though simpler since there are no sequential measurements in that case).
First, let us denote Alice and Bob’s measurement operators as Mx|a, NtestyA|bA , N
prot
y and N
prot
g|m ,
as described previously, but here we shall not assume they are projective. Note that this is in-
tended to denote the Kraus operators of the measurements, rather than the POVM elements.
More specifically, taking Mx|a (for a fixed a) as an example, this denotes a set of operators sat-
isfying ∑x M†x|a Mx|a = 1, such that the (subnormalized) state after performing the measurement
on a state ρ and getting outcome x is Mx|aρM†x|a. (This is slightly more detailed than specifying
POVM elements Ex|a  0 such that ∑x Ex|a = 1 and P(x) = Tr(Ex|aρ), because it incorporates an
explicit description of the post-measurement state. This allows, for instance, defining Ex|a such
that the measurement outcome is encoded into the post-measurement state, which is important
for sequential measurements.) For projective measurements, the two notions coincide and hence
we did not need to specify this distinction previously.
Let Y ′ and Y ′′ be 4-dimensional Hilbert spaces with orthonormal bases {|y′〉} and {|y′′〉}. We
first define the following isometries:
VtestbA |ν〉Y =∑
yA
|yA〉Y ′ NtestyA|bA |ν〉Y ,
Vprot |ν〉Y =∑
y
|y〉Y ′ Nproty |ν〉Y ,
Vprotm |y′〉Y ′ |ν〉Y =∑
g
|g y′〉Y ′′Y ′ Nprotg|m |ν〉Y .
(67)
We apply Lemma 9 with VtestbA being the isometries {Vj}n−1j=1 , Vprot being the isometry Vn, and
Vprotm being the isometries {V ′k}mk=1. This gives us corresponding unitaries on a Hilbert space L,
which we now take as the space in which all subsequent expressions are embedded. (In the finite-
dimensional case, one can perform a simpler construction in which Y ′′Y ′Y itself is the common
Hilbert space, see e.g. [NC10].) These unitaries match the actions of the isometries on their respec-
tive subspaces, i.e. UtestbA |ν〉Y = VtestbA |ν〉Y , Uprot |ν〉Y = Vprot |ν〉Y and U
prot
m |µ〉Y ′Y = Vprotm |µ〉Y ′Y .
For each isometry V, let L\V denote the subspace of L given by omitting the codomain of V
from the direct sum used to construct L (we introduce this technical detail just to ensure the PVM
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sets we construct below indeed sum to the identity on L). We then define projectors
ΠtestyA|bA = U
test †
bA ((|yA〉〈yA|Y ′ ⊗ 1Y )⊕ δyA,001L\Vtest
bA
)UtestbA ,
Πproty = Uprot †((|y〉〈y|Y ′ ⊗ 1Y )⊕ δy,001L\Vprot )Uprot,
Πprotg|m = U
prot †Uprot †m ((|g〉〈g|Y ′′ ⊗ 1Y ′Y )⊕ δg,001L\Vprotm )U
prot
m Uprot,
(68)
where δj,k denotes the Kronecker delta. It is easily seen that these form valid PVM sets. Impor-
tantly, these projectors have the useful property (omitting the 1L\V terms for brevity)
Πprotg|mΠ
prot
y = Uprot †U
prot †
m (|g〉〈g|Y ′′ ⊗ 1Y ′Y )Uprotm (|yA〉〈yA|Y ′ ⊗ 1Y )Uprot. (69)
We construct unitaries Ua and projectors Πx|a analogously for Alice, though for that we only
need to introduce a single ancillary system X ′. As for the state, we can simply take |ρ¯〉 = |ρ〉,
though with the understanding that it is now embedded in a larger Hilbert space. Using Eq. (69),
we now compute some probabilities resulting from these projective measurements:∥∥∥ΠxA|aAΠtestyA|bA |ρ〉∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥U†aAUtest †bA (|x yA〉MxA|aA NtestyA|bA |ρ〉)∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥MxA|aA NtestyA|bA |ρ〉∥∥∥2 , (70)∥∥∥Πx|aΠprotg|mΠproty |ρ〉∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥U†a Uprot †Uprot †m (|x g y〉Mx|aNprotg|m Nproty |ρ〉)∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥Mx|aNprotg|m Nproty |ρ〉∥∥∥2 , (71)
since the 2-norm is unitarily invariant. These probabilities include all terms appearing in the
cheating probability8, and are equal to those attained by the original POVMs on |ρ〉.
8We have exploited the fact that in our scenario, the measurements Mprotg|m are always only applied after the measure-
ment Mproty . If there had been another possible measurement (including a trivial measurement, i.e. identity operation)
to perform before measuring Mprotg|m , it might not always be possible to ensure that the equivalent of Eq. (69) holds
for that measurement as well. (In particular, when applying the NPA hierarchy, the projective measurements we con-
structed may not give the same value for all the Γ matrix elements as the original POVMs. However, this is not an issue
because the reduction to projective measurements occurs before applying the NPA hierarchy.)
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